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I. INTRODUCTION 
Louisiana law is known for its French and Spanish heritage. This 
legacy draws a bond with civil law systems all over the world 
through a common basis of codified legal principles. The Star Fi-
nancial case1 illustrates how the civil law tradition influences Lou-
isiana law (and practice) in the interpretation of contracts. 
 
 ∗   LL.M. (May 2019) Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Univer-
sity. The author would like to thank Professor Olivier Moréteau for his research 
suggestions and his guidance throughout the writing of this case note. 
 1. Star Financial Services, Inc. v. Cardtronics USA, Inc., 882 F.3d 176 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
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 The Louisiana Civil Code sets the determination of the common 
intent of the parties as the cardinal point in interpreting a contract.2 
This common intention is usually expressed by words, an objective 
declaration both parties could rely on. Yet, all the contingencies of 
the contract might not be put into words. In case of a dispute, courts 
may have to seek beyond ordinary words to ascertain the obligations 
of the parties and construe the meaning of the contract within the 
framework provided by the Louisiana Civil Code. When the plain 
language of the contract does not provide for all contingencies, may 
a court interpret it to construe implicit obligations?    
II. BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff Star Financial Services, Inc. (“Star Financial”), an au-
tomated teller machine (“ATM”) operator, entered into a contract with 
Cardtronics, USA, Inc. (“Cardtronics”) in which Cardtronics agreed to 
process the electronic transfer of funds associated with operating ATMs. 
In accordance with the contract, Star Financial had an obligation to pro-
vide Cardtronics with a “fully and accurately completed”3 terminal set-
up form for every terminal. Cardtronics would credit amounts with-
drawn by customers back to the bank account designated on the form. 
Star Financial also had the obligation to keep the terminal set-up forms 
“correct and complete”4 and to notify Cardtronics immediately in case 
of any change of information. 
The dispute arose when Star Financial mistakenly designated an ac-
count belonging to a third-party rather than its own when submitting ter-
minal set-up forms for three terminals to be activated. The next day, Star 
Financial notified Cardtronics of its mistake and provided accurate ter-
minal set-up forms for those terminals. Cardtronics received the 
 
 2. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2045 (2018). This provision echoes the French 
Civil Code, CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] former art. 1156 (now art. 1188 following the 
2016 Reform of Contract Law and Obligations). 
 3. Star Financial Services, 882 F.3d at 178. 
 4. Id. 
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information but only corrected the account information for one of the 
terminals. 
As a consequence, Cardtronics credited the amounts withdrawn 
from the two other terminals to a third-party account, rather than to 
Star Financial’s account. Star Financial promptly notified Cardtron-
ics of the error when it noticed an abnormal shortage of funds in its 
account. The misdirected funds amounted to a total of $250,000, of 
which Star Financial could only partly recover from the third-party 
account. Star Financial sued to recover the remaining funds, alleging 
a breach of Cardtronics’s obligations under the contract to correct 
the account information of the terminals and failure to reimburse 
Star Financial for the resulting misdirected funds. 
III. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted 
Cardtronics’s motion for summary judgement.5 The court ruled that, 
while the contract obliges Star Financial to provide Cardtronics with 
correct and complete terminal information, the “plain language of 
the contract”6 does not include Cardtronics’s obligation to correct 
the account information after receiving updated terminal set-up 
forms. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgement, concluding that the District Court misread 
the contract. First, the court noted that the interpretative inquiry of 
the court stops only when the words of the contract are “clear and 
explicit and lead to no absurd consequences.”7 In this case, the issue 
was that the contract does not explicitly state the contractual 
 
 5. Star Financial Services, Inc. v. Cardtronics USA, Inc., No. 16-12537, 
2017 WL 1064968, at *1 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2017). See Summary judgment, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014):  
A judgment granted on a claim or defense about which there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact and upon which the movant is entitled to prevail 
as a matter of law . . . . This procedural device allows the speedy dispo-
sition of a controversy without the need for trial. 
 6. Star Financial Services, 882 F.3d at 179. 
 7. Id. 
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obligations of Cardtronics upon receiving changes to a terminal set-
up form. In fact, the District Court determined that Cardtronics had 
no obligation to use the correct information. This finding, however, 
was not coherent with the with the contract’s repeated emphasis that 
Star Financial shall keep and submit correct terminal set-up forms. 
Indeed, this interpretation of the contract leads to the “absurd con-
sequence” that Star Financial could never make effective changes to 
its terminal set-up forms. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit interpreted that 
the contract provided an implicit obligation of Cardtronics to deploy 
account information consistent with the updated terminal set-up 
forms provided by Star Financial Services. 
IV. COMMENTARY 
The tradition in Louisiana jurisprudence is to apply a rule of 
strict construction when interpreting contracts.8 As it will be dis-
cussed, this goes against the civil law tradition. Louisiana Civil 
Code article 2046 provides, as a general principle, that “[w]hen the 
words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd con-
sequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the 
parties’ intent.” This District Court’s decision serves as an example 
of the application of the strict construction rule in Louisiana juris-
prudence. This rule provides that “courts are bound to give legal ef-
fect to contracts according to the true intent of the parties to the con-
tract,” and that  “intent must be determined by the words of the con-
tract when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd conse-
quences.”9 Therefore, this principle does not authorize perversion of 
language and prevents courts from making a new contract where the 
language employed by the parties expresses their true intent.10 
 
 8. SAUL LITVINOFF & RONALD J. SCALISE, 5 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE: LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS § 12.101 (2d ed. West 2018). 
 9. See Clearview Palms Partnerships v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 573 So.2d 
1206, 1209 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). 
 10. See LITVINOFF & SCALISE, supra note 8. 
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In this case, was the District Court’s application of the strict con-
struction rule appropriate? The words of the contract were clear and 
explicit as to the obligations of Star Financial, but they were not as 
to the obligations of Cardtronics. Under the strict construction 
rule, the absence of words was translated into an absence of 
obligation by the District Court. The Fifth Circuit deemed it an 
absurd consequence of the interpretation of the contract: it un-
dermined the effectiveness of the obligations of Star Financial. 
This case raises a discussion on the rules on the interpreta-
tion of contracts available to the courts (A), and how a con-
structive interpretation may be more appropriate to determine 
the intent of the parties (B). 
A. Interpretation of Implied Terms in the Louisiana Civil 
Code 
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, the interpretation 
of a contract is guided by the common intent of the parties.11 
Courts have the power to seek this common intent, but the Lou-
isiana Civil Code governs the instances when a contract needs 
to be interpreted and how to preserve a contract from denatur-
ation.  
This decision brings a reflection on the provisions of the 
Louisiana Civil Code, which contains several guidelines for the 
courts. When all contingencies are not expressly put into 
words, Louisiana law acknowledges the existence of implied 
terms. Several provisions support the idea that conditions12 and 
even obligations13 may be implied by the nature of the contract. 
Therefore, the reasoning that the absence of an express provi-
sion amounts to no obligation is not sound. Courts should look 
 
 11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (2018). 
 12. Id. at art. 1768: “Conditions may be either expressed in a stipulation or 
implied by the law, the nature of the contract, or the intent of the parties.” 
 13. Id. at art. 1777: “A term for the performance of an obligation may be 
express or it may be implied by the nature of the contract . . . .”  
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at the greater purpose of the contract when interpreting it. The 
provisions on the interpretation of contracts encourage courts 
to pursue the reasonable meaning of the contract. For instance, 
article 2050 specifies that provisions of the contract must be 
interpreted in light of each other in order to give meaning to 
the contract as a whole.14   
Surprisingly, neither the District Court nor the Fifth Cir-
cuit relied on article 2054,15 which was particularly appropri-
ate in this dispute. Indeed, article 2054 provides for cases 
where the parties made no provision for a particular situation. 
In this contract, the parties created a procedure for Star Fi-
nancial to make changes to a terminal set-up form but did not 
provide for Cardtronics’s obligations upon receiving these 
changes. Both courts chose to mobilize the strict construction 
rule by refraining from interpreting the contract or, on appeal, 
by pursuing interpretative inquiry. Precisely, Cardtronics’s 
obligation to deploy account information in an updated termi-
nal set-up form should be considered as “implied in a contract 
of that kind or necessary for the contract to achieve its pur-
pose” as provided by article 2054. Article 2051 also conveys 
the idea that courts may look beyond the general words of the 
contract to infer the obligations the parties intended to in-
clude.16  
Although this decision does not embrace the abundance of 
the provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code, the approach of 
 
 14. Id. at art. 2050: “Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light 
of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract 
as a whole.” 
This provision is substantially identical to C. CIV. art. 1189. 
 15. Id. at art. 2054: 
When the parties made no provision for a particular situation, it must be 
assumed that they intended to bind themselves not only to the express 
provisions of the contract, but also to whatever the law, equity, or usage 
regards as implied in a contract of that kind or necessary for the contract 
to achieve its purpose. 
 16. Id. at art. 2051: “Although a contract is worded in general terms, it must 
be interpreted to cover only those things it appears the parties intended to include.” 
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the Fifth Circuit raises a rather interesting alternative on con-
structive interpretation of contracts. 
B. A Necessary Constructive Interpretation of the Contract 
The District Court erred in reading the contract because its rea-
soning rested on an objective approach to the contract: the parties 
could only rely on the words used. Since there were no words de-
scribing Cardtronics’s obligations in the update procedure, there 
was no incentive to impose the unspecified on the company. The 
Fifth Circuit reviewed the case under an ad hoc gap filling approach, 
which is when “the party agreement is supplemented with terms that 
follow from the hypothetical will of the parties in the circumstances 
of the case.”17 Courts may interpret the agreement to fill in the gaps, 
implied terms that were not specified by the parties. The Fifth Cir-
cuit filled in the gaps by relying on article 2046. This provision 
opens the door to interpretative injury when the words of a contract 
lead to absurd consequences. 
Furthermore, it seems that the court read the contract as syn-
allagmatic and commutative one.18 The parties obligated themselves 
reciprocally, so both parties had an obligation that was correlative 
to the obligation of the other. On the one hand, Star Financial had to 
provide “accurately completed”19 terminal set-up forms to his elec-
tronic funds’ provider; and on the other hand, Cardtronics had to 
react according to the performance of the obligation of his counter-
party. Cardtronics’s obligation, although implied, was complemen-
tary to Star Financial’s obligation, and, necessary for the good pro-
cess of the transactions. 
 
 17. JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW—A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 122 
(Edward Elgar Publ’g 2014).  
 18. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1908 (2018): “A contract is bilateral, or syn-
allagmatic, when the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the obliga-
tion of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other.” Id. at art. 1911: “A 
contract is commutative when the performance of the obligation of each party is 
correlative to the performance of the other.”  
 19. Star Financial Services, 882 F.3d at 178. 
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The approach of the court can be compared to the French law 
theory of économie générale du contrat (economy of the contract). 
This concept was created under French jurisprudence and is increas-
ingly used by the Cour de cassation to analyze contracts, to remedy 
unwritten provisions, and to remedy inadequacies in order to recog-
nize the will expressed (or to substitute for the absence of expressed 
will of the parties).20 Under this approach, the judge considers the 
content of the contract in a comprehensive manner and conducts a 
business oriented reading of the contract, dissociating it from the 
prima facie intent of the parties. The Fifth Circuit used reasoning 
similar to that of French civil law when interpreting the contract, 
such that it would not lead to absurd consequences. The common 
incentive is to sort out the essence of a contract by looking first at 
the consequences of the inexecution of obligations on the function-
ing of the contract as a whole, rather than the words put on paper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The common intent of the parties is the starting point for the in-
terpretation of a contract, but it cannot remain an end in itself. In 
circumstances where a contract is silent, or where the parties have 
not anticipated all the outcomes of the contract, courts can vouch for 
the economy of the contract. In a constructive approach, the business 
efficacy of the contract should be almost as important as the words 
or the unwritten ones of the contract: the intent of the parties is the 
best achievement of the contract. Unless there is evidence that the 
parties intended differently, it is safe to assume that they intended 
their contract to be economically effective and efficient. 
 
 
 20. Ana Zelcevic-Duhamel, La notion d’économie du contrat en droit privé, 
JCP 2001, no. 300. 
